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Among the cases decided during the survey period, two opinions stand 
out as particularly noteworthy. First, United States v. Branch is certainly 
notable because it involved the prosecution of members of a religious sect, the 
Branch Davidians, and their participation in a gun battle which resulted in the 
death of agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.) The case 
is also significant due to the variety of new issues it raised. The second case 
of note, United States v. Lewis, is important because the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and is likely to resolve a conflict among the circuit courts 
as to an issue involving the Assimilative Crimes Act.2 In addition to these two 
cases, the Fifth Circuit continues to confront numerous interpretational issues 
involving the offense of "using or carrying a firearm" in relation to a crime of 
violence or drug trafficking.3 Finally, during the survey period the court also 
answered challenges that several federal laws violate the Commerce Clause 
based on the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Lopez.4 
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I. DEFENSES 
A. When Is an Instruction Required? 
The Branch case raised a rather basic, yet significant, question of what 
standard a trial court should apply when deciding whether to instruct the jury 
on a defense raised.s However, before discussing this issue in detail, a brief 
overview of the case is necessary. In Branch, eleven defendants were charged 
with, among other offenses, "aiding and abetting the murder of four agents of 
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (A TF) while said agents were 
engaged in the performance of their official duties."6 Although the jury found 
all eleven not guilty of this offense, they nevertheless convicted five 
defendants on the lesser-included offense of aiding and abetting the voluntary 
manslaughter of the federal agents.7 Four defendants challenged their 
convictions on the grounds that the district court erred by not instructing the 
jury on self-defense.8 While the district court instructed on self-defense as to 
aiding and abetting murder, it did not instruct on this defense as to aiding and 
abetting voluntary manslaughter.9 
The panel agreed that the standard for reviewing the district court's 
refusal to give the self-defense instruction is abuse of discretion; however, the 
panel split on the question of what level of evidence is necessary to require a 
self-defense instruction. 1O Unable to agree, or to be consistent, the Fifth 
Circuit has used three different standards as to the necessary evidentiary 
foundation: "(1) 'any evidence' regardless of how insubstantial; (2) 
'substantial evidence' defined as 'more than a scintilla'; and (3) 'evidence 
sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in [the defendant's] favor.' nil A 
majority of the panel applied the third standard, relying on the Supreme 
Court's precedent in Mathews v. United States. 12 While the opinion of the 
majority is more persuasive in establishing the correct level of evidence 
necessary for an instruction, it is interesting that in United States v. Peterson, 
also decided during the survey period, the court defined the standard as 
requiring that the requested instruction be "supported by the law and by some 
5. See Branch, 91 F.3d at 711. The Branch case raised a number ofissues that are discussed 
throughout this survey article. This section focuses only on the district court's failure to instruct the jury 
on the defense of self-defense as to the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughJer. 
6. Id. at 7\0; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (\994) (defining murder); id. § 1114 (setting forth the 
penalties for killing or attempting to kill an officer of the United States); id. § 2 (\ 994) (stating that 
whoever aids or abets an offense against the United States is punishable as a principal). 
7. See Branch, 91 F.3d at 711. 
8. See id. 
9. See id. 
10. See id. at 711-14,745-47. 
II. Id. at 745 (Schwarzer, DJ., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
12. See id. at 711-13 (citing Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (\988». 
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evidence in the record."13 While the correct standard was not at issue in 
Peterson, the court seemed to create yet a fourth standard. Thus the intra 
circuit conflict continues, leaving district courts with little guidance on this 
question. 
B. Evaluation of the Evidence Supporting Self-Defense in 
United States v. Branch 
Even applying the more stringent abuse of discretion standard, the Fifth 
Circuit panel in Branch was divided over the significance of evidence 
presented at trial. The tension between the majority and dissenting opinions 
regarding evaluation of the evidence presented to support a self-defense 
instruction centered on the extent to which the court considered each 
defendant's individual knowledge, versus the extent to which the court 
. attributed knowledge of other Davidians to the four defendants convicted of 
aiding and abetting the voluntary manslaughter of the federal agents. 14 The 
four defendants, in support of their claim of self-defense, contended they did 
not know the people attacking the compound were federal agents, or, even if 
they did know the identity of the agents, the defendants believed that the 
agents were employing excessive force. IS In the portion of the opinion 
evaluating the evidence relating to the identity of the federal agents, the court 
made no mention of any evidence to indicate that any of the four defendants 
were in a position to hear the agents announce themselves and that they had 
a search warrant. 16 Nor did the court point to any evidence that any of the four 
defendants were in a position to see the agents with the bright yellow" A TF" 
lettering on their clothes. 17 The court relied on the fact that several Davidians 
overheard their leader, David Koresh, remark that the A TF was coming. IS 
Yet, the court did not point to evidence that indicated any of the four 
defendants had heard these comments by their leader.19 In a compound large 
enough to house 115 people, at a minimum, the court should have relied on 
evidence that revealed the location of each of the four.20 The court also relied 
on evidence that Koresh knew the armed people were A TF agents.21 Even so, 
Koresh was not a defendant.22 Thus, the court improperly relied on what other 
13. 101 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir. Nov. 1996) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1346 (1997). 
14. See Branch, 91 F.3d at 714-16, 747-49. 
15. See id. at 715-20. 
16. See id. at 715-16. 
17. See id. 
18. See id. at 715. 
19. See id. 
20. When the ATF decided to proceed with the plan to execute the warrants and conduct arrests, 
approximately 115 people resided within the compound. See id. at 710. 
21. See id. at 715. 
22. See id. at 710-11. David Koresh died in the fire ignited by the Davidians. See id. at 710. 
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Davidians knew, and attributed this knowledge to the four defendants without 
establishing that the defendants were also in a position to have this 
knowledge. 
Similarly, as to the defendants' claim that the ATF agents engaged in 
excessive force, the court examined the statements of one of the four 
defendants, Castillo, and found that as an aggressor, he had no self-defense 
c1aim.23 The court then apparently attributed this aggressor status to the other 
three defendants as well-without discussing evidence indicating their status 
as aggressors.24 Nonetheless, the majority acknowledged that only Castillo 
could claim any possible benefit from his statements to support a self-defense 
claim; thus, in this instance they evaluated self-defense individually as to 
Castillo.2S Therefore, on one hand, the court attributed Castillo's role as an 
aggressor to the other three defendants, yet, on the other hand, denied the 
other three any possible benefit from Castillo's statements regarding self-
defense. 
In contrast, examining again the issue of excessive force, the court 
discounted the te&timony of some Davidians that there was indiscriminate 
firing by the agents through the walls and windows of the compound.26 The 
court stated that this would be relevant only if those Davidians had been 
convicted, but pointed out that "there was no evidence that any of the 
defendants either came under indiscriminate, unprovoked fire or knew that 
such fire was taking place .... [Thus,] [t]here are no vicarious defenses.'127 
The majority went on to state that the "knowledge of one resident cannot 
simply be imputed to all who are at the compound."2s Even so,· this is 
precisely what the court did as to the identity of the federal agents. These 
inconsistencies and logical fallacies leave the reader, and this commentator, 
perplexed. 
The dissenting judge pointed out that since the offense at issue was not 
a group crime, the court had to evaluate evidence regarding the "culpability 
of individual defendants."29 However, the dissent pointed to evidence which 
would link only one defendant to such knowledge.30 As to the other three 
defendants' belief that the agents employed excessive force, the dissenting 
judge relied on statements made by other Davidians and argued that the jury 
might have reasonably attributed this to the individual defendants.31 Thus, the 
23. See id. at 717-19. 
24. See id. at 747-49 (Schwarzer, OJ., dissenting). 
25. See id. at 717 n.3. 
26. See id. at 719-20. 
27. [d. at 719 (emphasis added). 
28. [d. L 
29. [d. at 747 (Schwarzer, OJ., dissenting). 
30. See id. at 748 n.S (Schwarzer, OJ., dissenting). The defendant, Branch, went into a room 
where Ms. Schroeder experienced indiscriminate gun fire. See id. (Schwarzer, OJ., dissenting). 
31. See id. at 749 (Schwarzer, OJ., dissenting). 
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dissenting opinion contains the same logical inconsistencies as those that 
plague the majority opinion. 
The inconsistencies found in the Branch majority and dissenting opinions 
raise serious questions about the extent to which a court can effectively 
evaluate the culpability of individual defendants when nearly two hundred 
people were involved in the incident, and eleven defendants were ultimately 
tried together. 
II. THE ASSIMILATIVE CRIMES ACT 
A little known or employed statute, the Assimilative Crimes Act 
(ACA),32 came up in three Fifth Circuit cases during the survey period and, 
significantly, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in one of these cases, 
United States v. Lewis.33 The ACA allows state criminal law to fill gaps 
where federal law does not cover a particular offense;34 yet, the conduct in 
question in Lewis occurred on a "federal enclave" as required by 18 U .S.C. § 
7.35 Thus, the Act serves to incorporate state law in this circumstance.36 
In Lewis, authorities charged James and Debra Lewis with the beating 
death of their four-year-old child; the crime occurred at Fort Polk, a United 
States army base in Louisiana.37 The issue was whether the prosecutor 
properly charged the Louisiana first degree murder statute through the ACA 
when federal law criminalizes the same conduct under 18 U.S.C. § 1111.38 
The difference between the two statutes, however, is that the Louisiana statute 
includes first degree murder situations where "the offender has specific intent 
to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon a victim under the age of twelve or 
sixty-five years of age or 0Ider,"39 whereas federal law includes a specific 
definition of first degree murder that does not include the age of the victim as 
a factor.4o The federal statute provides that "[a]ny other murder is murder in 
32. See 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1994). 
33. 92 F.3d 1371 (5th Cir. Aug. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 1690 (1997). 
34. See 18 U.S.c. § 13(a) (1994). The relevant section of the Act provides, 
Whoever within or upon any of the places now existing or hereafter reserved or acquired as 
provided in section 7 of this title, is guilty of any act or omission which, although not made 
punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be punishable if committed or omitted within 
the jurisdiction of the State ... in which such place is situated, by the laws thereof in force at 
the time of such act or omission, shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to a like 
punishment. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
35. See Lewis, 92 FJd at 1373; 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1994) (defining territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States). 
36. See William P. Weiner, Ours or Theirs? The Impact of the Assimilative Crimes Act on Federal 
Prosecutions. 2 Preview 82 (1997); United States v. Brown, 608 F.2d 551, 553 (5th Cir. 1979). 
37. See Lewis, 92 F.3d at 1373. 
38. See id. 
39. Id. (quoting LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:30A(S) (West 1997». 
40. The federal statute at issue, 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (1994) provides: 
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the second degree."41 In rendering its opinion, the court cited only two 
Supreme Court opinions: United States v. Sharpnack and Williams v. United 
States.42 The court looked to Sharpnack for the proposition that "where 
Congress has enacted legislation criminalizing conduct on the enclaves, the 
federal statutes preempt the state laws regarding those crimes."43 The 
government, therefore, cannot employ the state statute.44 The court also 
followed Williams, which in effect held that the ACA "could not enlarge the 
definition of the federal carnal knowledge crime by incorporating the state 
statutory rape statute through the ACA."45 Although the "precise acts" covered 
by the state and federal statutes were the same, the relevant age of the victim 
was not. In Williams, the crime was statutory rape which the federal law 
defines as carnal knowledge of a minor under the age of sixteen, whereas 
Arizona law sets the age at eighteen.46 Since the victim was seventeen, there 
was no federal crime, and the Supreme Court reversed the conviction based 
on the Arizona statuteY The court in Lewis noted that after Williams, a 
majority of circuit courts, including the Fifth Circuit, followed the "precise 
acts" test which prohibits application of the ACA when the precise act 
prohibited by the state statute is defined and prohibited by the federal statute.48 
The Fifth Circuit held that the provision in the Louisiana murder statute did 
not define a different act of murder, but only "affect[ed] the degree of the 
crime and the level of punishment."49 Essentially, the court stated that 
"murder is murder" and the federal and state statutes do not punish different 
conduct. Thus, the court held that use of the ACA was error. 50 Nonetheless, 
the court upheld the convictions finding that the elements required for the 
Louisiana statute satisfied the elements necessary for second degree murder 
under the federal statute.51 In addition, the court held that re-sentencing was 
not necessary since the life imprisonment sentences received by the two 
Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful, deliberate, 
malicious, and premeditated killing; or committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to 
perpetrate, any arson, escape, murder, kidnapping, treason, espionage, sabotage, aggravated 
sexual abuse or sexual abuse, burglary, or robbery; or perpetrated from a premeditated design 
unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any human being other than him who is 
killed, is murder in the first degree. 
18 U.S.C. § 11 11 (a)(1994). 
41. ld. 
42. See Lewis, 92 F.3d at 1375 (citing United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958); Williams 
v. United States, 327 U.S. 711 (1946». 
43. ld. (citing Sharpnack, 355 U.S. at 291). 
44. See id. 
45. ld. (citing Williams, 327 U.S. at 718). 
46. See Williams, 327 U.S. at 714 n.6. 
47. See id. at 725. 
48. See Lewis, 92 F.3d at 1374. 
49. ld. at 1376. 
50. See id. at 1377. 
51. See id. at 1378. 
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defendants did not exceed the maximum sentence under the federal statute.S2 
While the Supreme Court is likely to resolve the issue of whether the "precise 
act" test is correct, the Court is unlikely to address the other issues of 
interpretation of the ACA raised in other Fifth Circuit cases during the survey 
period. 
For instance, in United States v. Teran, the issue involving the ACA was 
procedural but equally complicated.s3 The defendant in Teran challenged the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the federal magistrate because the Texas driving 
while intoxicated (OWl) statute pennitted a punishment of up to two years 
imprisonment.S4 Federal law would have classified the pennitted punishment 
as a felony, and therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of a federal magistrate.ss 
Thus, the court faced the question of whether the ACA "requires that the 
maximum punishment range under state law [also] be assimilated."s6 The 
Fifth Circuit noted that there is a presumption against selective assimilation, 
but emphasized that federal courts should not assimilate state law provisions 
that " 'conflict with federal policy.' "S7 The court detennined that the state 
maximum punishment conflicted with the federal policy of reliance on federal 
magistrates" 'to promote the efficiency of [the] federal criminal process by 
pennitting offenses of ... [this] type ... to be tried by a Magistrate ... .' "S8 
Based on this policy exception, the court detennined that the jurisdiction of 
the magistrate was proper over the defendant's conviction.s9 
Similarly, United States v. Bailey raised an issue as to which rule, state 
or federal, should govern where the state criminal provision has been 
assimilated under the ACA.60 The specific question was whether the 
defendant was entitled to a lesser included offense instruction.61 One prong 
of the federal and state tests for such an instruction differed, while the second 
prong was substantially the same under both.62 Rather than detennine which 
test was to control, the court concluded that the defendant's request for a 
lesser included instruction failed under both tests.63 
52. See id. at 1380. Second degree murder is punishable by imprisonment "for any tenn of years 
or for life: 18 U.S.c. § 1111(b) (1994). . 
53. 98 F.3d 831 (5th Cir. Oct. 1996). 
54. See id. at 833. In Teran, the magistrate revoked the defendant's parole and sentenced him to 
six months incarceration. See id. 
55. See id. Federal magistrates have criminal jurisdiction over misdemeanors but not felonies. 
See 18 U.S.c. § 3401 (1994). 
56. Teran, 98 F.3d at 834. 
57. Id. (quoting United States v. Davis, 845 F.2d 94, 99 (5th Cir. 1988». 
58. Id. at 835 (citing United States v. Kelly, 989 F.2d 162, 164 (4th Cir. 1983) (resolving the same 
jurisdictional issue». 
59. See id. 
60. III F.3d 1229, 1238 (5th Cir. Apr. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 327 (1997). 
61. See id. 
62. See id. 
63. See id. 
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III. FIREARMS AND 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c)(l) 
A. Independent Offense or Sentence Enhancement? 
In United States v. Branch, the court faced the question of whether the 
trial judge correctly imposed a thirty year sentence where there had been no 
jury determination that the defendants had used a machine gun.64 The 
punishment enhancement provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l) initially provide 
for a sentence of five years for one who "uses or carries a firearm" in relation 
to a crime of violence.6s Subsequent clauses provide for longer sentences 
depending upon the type of weapon used.66 In Branch, the district court 
sentenced four defendants to thirty years and another to ten years on their 
section 924( c)( I) convictions, finding that "each of the five defendants had 
used or were criminally responsible for someone who had used a machine gun 
during the conspiracy."67 However, the prosecution did not charge, and the 
jury failed to make factual findings as to the type of firearm used.68 
Confronted with a question of first impression, the court looked to both 
the structure of the statute as well as the legislative history.69 The court found 
it significant that Congress added the machine gun clause to the statute instead 
of creating another, separate section.70 In addition, the House Report stated 
that the clause was to impose an "[e Jnhanced penalty for machine gun use in 
crime," and there was never any indication that Congress intended to create 
a new and separate offense.71 The court discounted as dicta prior indications 
that section 924(c)(I) "may require the jury to agree on which type of weapon 
was used."72 In conclusion, the court held that the clauses in the statute 
providing for longer sentences based on the type of weapon used did not 
require the government to charge, nor the jury to make factual findings as to 
the particular weapon used or carried by the defendant.73 Nonetheless, the 
[d. 
64. 91 F.3d 699, 751 (5th Cir. Aug. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1467 (1997). 
65. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(I) (1994). 
66. See id. The provision, in relevant part, states as follows: 
Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime ... , uses 
or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence 
or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years, and if the firearm is a 
short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun, or semiautomatic assault weapon, to imprisonment 
for ten years, and if the firearm is a machine gun, or a destructive device, or is equipped with 
a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, to imprisonment for thirty years. 
67. Branch, 91 F.3d at 738. 
68. See id. 
69. See id. at 739-40. 
70. See id. at 739. 
71. [d. at 739 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 495, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 28 (1986), reprinted in 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327, 1354) (emphasis added). 
72. [d. (quoting United States v. Correa-Ventura, 6 F.3d 1070, 1087 n.35 (5th Cir. 1993». 
73. See id. at 740; see also United States v. Gonzales, 121 F.3d 928, 941 (5th Cir. Aug. 1997) 
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court vacated the sentence and remanded for re-sentencing based on Bailey v. 
United States.74 
B. The Aftermath of Bailey v. United States, Continued 
More than twenty percent of the cases reviewed, eleven out offifty-two,7S 
involved applications of the United States Supreme Court opinion of Bailey 
v. United States.76 In Bailey, the Supreme Court set out a definition of the 
tenn "use" for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), which imposes a minimum 
five-year tenn of imprisonment on anyone who" 'during and in relation to any 
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime ... uses or carries a fireann.' ,,77 
The Court rejected the argument that section 924(c)(1) criminalized 
" 'simpl[e] possession with a floating intent to use,' ,,78 and instead held that 
the Government must prove that the defendant "actively employed the firearm 
during and in relation to the predicate crime.,,79 To illustrate the differences 
between these standards the Court stated that active employment of a fireann 
under section 924( c)( 1) "certainly includes brandishing, displaying, bartering, 
striking with, and most obviously, firing or attempting to fire a fireann."8o In 
addition, the Court stated that "a reference [by an offender] to a firearm 
calculated to bring about a change in the circumstances of the predicate 
offense is a 'use.' ,,81 In contrast, merely storing a weapon in the vicinity of 
drugs or drug proceeds, without more, is insufficient to satisfy section 
924(c)(1).82 In the two consolidated cases, the Court held that where one 
defendant had a loaded pistol in the trunk of the car the defendant was &iving, 
and the other had an unloaded fireann in a locked footlocker in the 
defendant's residence, neither "actively employed" the weapon.83 
(rejecting a similar argument that the thirty year sentence for machine gun use is a separate offense as 
opposed to a sentence enhancement). 
74. See Branch, 91 F.3d at 740-41 (citing Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995». 
75. One of these cases, United States v. Garcia, 86 F.3d 394 (5th Cir. June 1996), cert. denied, 
117 S. Ct. 752 (1997), was discussed in last year's survey. Therefore, to avoid repetition here, this author 
refers the reader to Bubany, supra note 3, at 451-52. 
76. 516 U.S. 137 (1995). For additional analysis of the Bailey decision, see Kristin Whiting, The 
Aftermath of Bailey v. United States: Should Possession Replace Carry and Use Under 18 U.S.c. § 
9U(c)(I)?, 5 J.L. & POL'y 679 (1997); Amy L. Eckert, Note, Criminal Law-18 u.S.C. § 
9U(c)(I)-Narrow Interpretation of "Use" of a Firearm, 64 TENN. L. REv. 515 (1997); Jeffrey R. 
Kesselman, Note, Excuse Me. Are You "Using " That Gun? The United States Supreme Court Examines 
18 U.S.c. § 9U(c)(l) in Bailey v. United States, 30 CREIGHTON L. REv. 513 (1997). 
77. Bailey, 516 U.S. at 138 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(I) (1994». 
78. [d. at 144 (quoting United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106, 121 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en bane) 
(Williams, J., dissenting». . 
79. [d. at 150. 
80. [d. at 148. 
81. [d. 
82. See id. at 149. 
83. See id. at 151. 
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As to the factual aspect of the crime of "using" a firearm in relation to 
violent or drug trafficking offenses, the Fifth Circuit found sufficient evidence 
to support a conviction in United States v. Johnson.84 In Johnson, the 
defendant reached for a weapon in a partially zippered pouch located on the 
transmission hump near the front seat of the car while attempting to hide a bag 
of cocaine base.8S In contrast to the defendant in Bailey, who hid the weapon 
in the trunk of his car, the defendant in Johnson reached for the weapon after 
police had stopped the car and were approaching.86 The court held that the 
jury could have found that the defendant "hoped to evade arrest for the 
predicate drug offense by arming himself," thus the government had proven 
that the defendant "used" the gun.87 
It appears the court's analysis involved an overlap of two elements of the 
offense. First, the element requiring "use" of a firearm, and second, the 
element requiring the weapon to be "in relation to" the drug offense. The 
Supreme Court had previously stated that "in relation to" requires a showing 
that the firearm" 'facilitat[ ed], or ha[ d] the potential of facilitating the drug 
trafficking offense.' ,,88 The Johnson court's conclusion regarding the jury's 
possible finding that the defendant hoped to evade arrest by attempting to get 
the gun, would appear to satisfy the "in relation to" element.89 From this, the 
court concluded that reaching for the gun also constituted "use."90 This logic 
does not seem consistent with the Bailey opinion and may have been avoided 
by affirming the conviction based on the "carry" prong. Johnson was charged 
with "using and carrying" a firearm and the judge instructed the jury that they 
could convict if Johnson "used or carried" a firearm.91 Other'cases decided 
during the survey period held that where the weapon was within the 
defendant's reach, the defendant "carried" the weapon for purposes of section 
924(c)(l).92 
In United States v. Ulloa, the court rejected the argument that Bailey 
required an approach different from pre-Bailey cases with regard to the 
bartering of weapons for drugs.93 In Ulloa, the defendant entered into an 
84. 87 F.3d 133 (5th Cir. June 1996), cerl. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1482 (1997). 
85. See id. at 135. 
86. See id. 
87. Id. at 138 . 
. 88. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 238 (1993) (quoting United States v. Stewart,'779 F.2d 
538, 540 (9th Cir. 1985». 
89. See Johnson, 87 F.3d at 138. 
90. See id. 
91. Id. at 138 n.5 . .In fact, this reasoning appears similar to the discussion by the dissenter in 
United Slales v. Garcia, 86 F.3d 394, 403 (5th Cir. June 1996) (Jones, J., dissenting), cerl. denied, 117 
S. Ct. 752 (1997). See also Bubany, supra note 3, at 452 (noting that in Garcia the government only 
charged "use," while in Johnson, the government charged the defendant with both ·using and carrying"). 
92. See infra notes 111-50 and accompanying text. 
93. 94 F.3d 949, 955 (5th Cir. Aug. 1996), cerl. denied. 117 S. Ct. 1338 (1997). 
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agreement with undercover agents to supply drugs in exchange for weapons.94 
Although the Supreme Court in Bailey expressly affirmed its precedent of 
Smith v. United States by including "bartering" within the definition of"use,"9s 
the defendant in Smith had provided the we~pons while in Ulloa the Bureau 
of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Fireanns supplied the weapons.96 The court 
affirmed the conviction, which was based on Ulloa's guilty plea, and found 
that Bailey did not require the defendant to exercise "dominion and control" 
over the weapons, and did not alter the Fifth Circuit precedent of United 
States v. Zuniga,97 where the government agents had also supplied the 
weapons.98 
A case consolidated with Bailey had facts similar to those found in 
United States v. Payne.99 In Payne, the government conceded that where the 
police found a firearm on the defendant's bedroom nightstand at the time of 
arrest and the defendant was outside, the Bailey definition of use was not 
satisfied. loo Thus, the court reversed the firearm convictions.101 
The Fifth Circuit also reversed a conviction for a section 924(c)(l) 
offense in United States v. Blount. I02 In Blount, one firearm was found on the 
television set in the residence where the defendant was arrested, and drugs and 
other weapons were found in a locked closet of the residence. 103 The court 
concluded that the mere fact of finding such weapons in the residence, without 
more, did not satisfy the government's burden to show that these weapons 
were "used ... for some end or purpose related to drug trafficking."I04 
Similarly, in United States v. Dickey, the court reversed a conviction 
under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(I) despite the fact that Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) agents found and seized seven weapons in the 
defendant's house and trailer. IDS The government failed to produce any 
evidence that the defendant had "carried" any firearms, and as to "use," the 
government failed to produce evidence other than the fact of the agent's 
discovery of the seven firearms. 106 The court held that the government failed 
to demonstrate that the defendant even "displayed" a firearm, an offense listed 
94. See id. at 950. 
95. Bailey v. United States, 508 U.S. 137,223 (1993). 
96. See Ulloa, 94 F.3d at 950. 
97. 18 F.3d 1254 (5th Cir. 1994). 
98. See Ulloa, 94 F.3d at 955·56. 
99. 99 F.3d 1273 (5th Cir. Nov. 1996). 
100. See id. at 1279. 
101. See id. 
102. 98 F.3d 1489, 1494 (5th Cir. Oct 1996), rev'd en bane on other grounds, 123 F.3d 831, 832-
34 (5th Cir. Sept. 1997), eert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 895 (1998). 
103. See id. at 1493. 
104. Id. at 1494. 
105. 102 F.3d 157, 165 (5th Cir. Dec. 1996). The agents also found other evidence relating to the 
drug trafficking offense. See id. 
106. See id. 
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as an example by the United States Supreme Court, because the government 
offered no evidence indicating the firearms were displayed to anyone. 107 
"[O]isplaying necessarily implies that there is someone to whom the firearm 
is displayed, [and] ... displaying requires a displayor and a displayee.'1I08 The 
government failed to support a finding that the guns were displayed in relation 
to the drug trafficking activity because the government failed to show that 
anyone actually saw the firearms. 109 The court went on to state that even if the 
mere presence of the firearms in an open and obvious location was sufficient 
to constitute "use," the evidence nonetheless failed to show that such "use" 
was in relation to the offense of manufacturing methamphetamine; that is, the 
firearms were not " 'an operative factor in relation to the predicate 
offense.' ,,110 
In contrast, the defendant in United States v. Morris faces a new trial 
despite the fact that there was insufficient evidence under Bailey to establish 
"use" of a firearm. I I I In Morris, police found a weapon on the table next to 
where the defendant was sitting. 112 After the Supreme Court handed down the 
Bailey decision, Morris filed a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255.113 The court held that while Bailey required vacating the conviction 
to the extent it was based on the "use" prong, a new trial was proper since a 
jury might find that the defendant had "carried" the firearm within the 
meaning of section 924( c)( 1).114 The conviction in Morris was for "using and 
carrying" a firearm. lIS Thus, it seems that where both carrying and using are 
charged, the defendant will face a new trial where the evidence is insufficient 
to support a finding of "use" or "carrying" ofa firearm. However, if the court 
found that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant 
"carried" the weapon, it is unclear why the court did not deny the habeas 
corpus petition. Nonetheless, the court took the opportunity to define "carry" 
to require that the prosecution prove "the defendant transported the firearm or 
had it within his reach during and in relation to the commission of the 
underlying offense."116 Since the weapon was on a table next to the defendant, 
and thus within his reach, it is unlikely that the government will have any 
difficulty convicting Morris at a new trial. 
107. See id. 
108. [d. 
109. See id. 
110. [d. (quoting Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 143 (1995». 
II J. United States v. Morris, No. 96-60310, 1997 U.S. App. Lexis 11976, at·S (5th Cir.June 6, 
1997). 
112. See id. 
I 13. See id. at ·2. 
114. See idat ·5. 
115. See id. at ·2. 
116. [d. at·S (citing United States v. Hall, 110 F.3d 1155, 1156 (5th Cir. Apr. 1997». 
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United States v. Hall was also decided during the survey period and 
involved facts similar to those in Morris.1I7 In Hall, the defendant pled guilty 
to the section 924( c)( 1) offense. 118 The police found and seized one firearm 
located on the floor near a coffee table in the living room where Hall and 
other defendants were located at the time of the search. 119 A second firearm 
was found in the bedroom where another defendant was located. 120 Applying 
Bailey, the court determined that the evidence was insufficient to support a 
finding that the defendant had "used" a firearm.121 The mere fact that "Hall 
was in the same room as the weapon when the officers entered, and the 
weapon was on the floor a few feet from the table upon which drugs and 
paraphernalia were sitting," was not enough to show that Hall had "used" the 
gun by displaying it, mentioning it, or otherwise actively employing it.122 In 
addition, the court held that the government produced insufficient evidence 
to support a finding that Hall "carried" the weapon. 123 Employing an analysis 
similar to that used by the Supreme Court in Bailey to define the "use" prong, 
the court looked to the dictionary definition of the term "carry.,,124 This 
definition included, "[to] 'transport,''' "'to wear or have on one's person,' 
,,125 and" 'to bear, bear about, sustain, transport, remove, or convey.' "126 
Rather than limit the "carry" prong to these situations, the court determined 
that this prong is satisfied when the defendant either transports the weapon or 
it is "within his reach-during and in relation to the predicate crime."127 
Although this definition is not necessarily new, it is significant in that it is the 
first post-Bailey formulation by the Fifth Circuit that attempts to track the 
Bailey analysis and apply it to the "carry" prong. 128 It is also interesting that 
this analysis did not lead to a different result than that reached in pre-Bailey 
cases examining the carry prong. However, other circuits adhere to broader 
117. 110 F.3d 1155 (5th Cir. Apr. 1997). 
118. See id. at 1156. 
119. See id. at 1158. 
120. See id. 
121. See id. at 1160. 
122. [d. 
123. See id. at 1161. 
124. See id. 
125. [d. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 343 (\ 961». 
126. [d. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 214 (6th ed. 1990». 
127. [d. 
128. See id. at 1162; see also United States v. Blankenship, 923 F.2d 1110, 1116 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(holding that to be determined as carrying, the firearm must have been within the reach during the 
commission of the offense); United States v. Feliz..cordero, 859 F.2d 250, 253 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that 
evidence that a weapon was within reach was sufficient to prove that the defendant "carried" the weapon 
for purposes of§ 924(c)(1»; United States v. Joseph, 892 F.2d 118, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that 
evidence that the defendant had a ·present ability to exercise dominion and control over a firearm and that 
the firearm [was] within easy reach" supported a finding that the defendant carried the weapon). 
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definition of "carry" that does not require a showing that the weapon was 
within the defendant's reach.129 
Another aspect of the "carrying" prong involves situations where the 
police find a weapon in the car driven by the defendant. Under Bailey, the 
"use" prong is not satisfied when the police find the weapon in the trunk of a 
car. 110 During the survey period, the Fifth Circuit recognized that "[w]hen a 
vehicle is used, 'carrying' takes on a different meaning from carrying on the 
person because the means of carrying is the vehicle itself," and thus requires 
actual transportation of the weapon. III In United States v. McPhail, the 
defendant was convicted of "using or carrying" a weapon under section 
924( c)(1). \32 The court reversed the conviction because there was insufficient 
evidence that the appellant transported a gun during or in relation to drug 
trafficking. III First, relying on Bailey, the court determined that there was no 
evidence to show that the defendant had "actively employed" or used a 
weapon. ll4 Second, as to the "carry" prong, the mere presence of the weapon 
in the car did not establish that the defendant actually transported the weapon 
in relation to the drug transaction. Il5 Without additional evidence to show that 
the defendant was in the car, that the defendant drove the car, or even that the 
defendant's car was operable, the government failed to prove the "carry" 
prong. ll6 The court also expressly stated that the holding in Bailey applies 
retroactively because that case defined the conduct "criminalized by the 
statute."m 
In United States v. Muscarello, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district 
court's dismissal and reinstated the conviction based on the defendant's guilty 
129. See, e.g., United States v. Cleveland, 106 F.3d 1056, 1066-1068 (1st Cir. 1997), cerro granted, 
118 S. Ct. 621 (1997) (holding that "the ordinary meaning of the term 'carry' ... affords no basis for 
imposing an accessibility requirement"); United States v. Mitchell, 104 F.3d 649, 653-54 (4th Cir. 1997) 
("[W]e conclude that the plain meaning of the term 'tarry' ... requires knowing possession and bearing, 
movement, conveyance, or transportation of the firearm in some manner."); United States v. Molina, 102 
F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[W]e need not concern ourselves with the question of whether the gun was 
within immediate reach ... [because) it was surely carried in relation to the crime when it was transported 
in a car in the same compartment that contains drugs possessed with the intent to distribute."). But see 
United States v. Mauldin, 109 F.3d 1159, 1161 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating that "carrying" requires "more than 
mere possession or storage"); United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667, 676 (2nd Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 
S. Ct. 135 (1996) ("[A) person cannot be said to 'carry' a firearm without at least a showing that the gun 
is within reach during the commission of the drug offense."). 
130. See Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 143-44 (1995). 
131. See United States v. McPhail, 112 F.3d 197,200-01 (5th Cir. May 1997) (quoting United 
States v. Pineda-Ortuno, 952 F.2d 98,104 (5th Cir. 1992», reh'gen banc denied. 119 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 
1997». 
132. Id. at 198. 
133. See id. (citing United States v. Fike, 82 F.3d 1315, 1328 (5th Cir. 1996». 
134. See id. at 199 (stating that the government conceded that the "use" prong had not been 
satisfied.) 
135. See id. 
136. See id. at 199-200. 
137. See id. 
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plea to a section 924( c)(1) offense. 138 The plea established that the loaded 
fireann found in the glove compartment ofthe defendant's truck was "carried 
for protection in relation to" the drug trafficking offense.139 The'district court, 
relying on Bailey, dismissed the conviction and found that the evidence was 
insufficient to establish that the defendant had "used" the fireann. 14o In 
reversing, the court stated that the Bailey analysis did not affect the "carry" 
prong of section 924(c)(1).141 Furthermore, the court recognized that a factual 
basis for "carrying" was present because the defendant admitted he used the 
truck during the commission of the underlying crime.142 The Supreme Court 
has granted certiorari in this case, which calls into doubt the Fifth Circuit's 
analysis. 143 The Court is likely to focus on the factual basis for satisfying both 
the "carry" and "in relation" prongs of the section 924(c)(1) offense. At the 
time of his arrest, the defendant was employed in the sheriff's office as a 
bailiff, thus calling into question whether the "in relation" prong was 
satisfied. 144 Additionally, the admission in the plea agreement does not 
indicate that the defendant "carried" the weapon, but rather that he was in 
possession of it, which according to Bailey is insufficient. 145 The Fifth Circuit 
did not rely on evidence independent of the plea agreement to support the 
finding that the defendant "carried" the weapon "in relation" to a drug-
trafficking crime. 146 
In United States v. Branch, the court remanded section 924(c)(1) 
convictions where the district court found that the defendants" '[ e ]ach either 
had actual or constructive possession of the numerous fully automatic 
weapons and hand grenades present in the Compound.' ,,147 The court stated 
that the district court's finding did not satisfy the statutory requirement, 
defined in Bailey, requiring the government to prove that the defendant 
"actively employed" the firearm.148 Therefore, the Branch court concluded 
that a finding of mere possession was not enough. 149 
Finally, it is worth noting that, during the survey period, the Fifth Circuit 
was not confronted with the question of whether other charges dismissed 
138. 106 F.3d 636, 636 (5th Cir. Feb. 1997) (per curiam), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 621 (1997). 
139. Id. at 637 (emphasis added). 
140. See id. 
141. See id. 
142. See id. at 639. 
143. See Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 621 (Dec. 12,1997). 
144. See Muscarello, 106 F.3d at 638. 
145. See id. at 638-39. 
146. See id. (stating that the court was relying solely on the contents of the plea agreement). 
147. 91 F.3d 699, 740-41 (5th Cir. Aug. 1996) (quoting the unpublished district opinion), cert. 
denied, 117 S. Ct. 1467 (1997). 
148. See id. 
149. See id. at 740. 
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pursuant to a plea agreement might be reinstated when the section 924(c)(I) 
conviction is vacated. 150 
C. The Predicate Offense 
In United States v. Branch, the jury convicted five of the eleven 
defendants under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(I).1Sl The predicate crime of violence 
charged involved conspiracy to murder federal agents. 152 However, the jury 
acquitted all defendants of the conspiracy charge. 153 Thus, the question was 
whether the court could uphold the section 924( c)( 1) offense even though the 
jury had not convicted the defendants on the predicate violent crime.154 Prior 
Fifth Circuit opinions established that a conviction on the predicate offense 
was not necessary to establish the fact of the compound offense for purposes 
of section 924( c)( 1).155 On appeal, dissenting Judge Schwarzer stated that the 
Branch court had to determine "whether there was sufficient evidence that 
each of the defendants joined the conspiracy with the requisite intent." 156 
Again, the majority and dissent parted company.157 The panel agreed as to the 
definition of conspiracy-" 1) two or more people agreed to pursue an unlawful 
objective; 2) the individual defendant voluntarily agreed to join the 
conspiracy; and 3) one or more of the members of the conspiracy performed 
150. See Bubany, supra note 3, at 453 (predicting that this issue, left unanswered by Bailey, would 
eventually need to be addressed); see also, e.g., United States v. Bunner, 134 F.3d 1000, 1005 (10th Cir. 
1998) (allowing prosecution "to reinstate previously dismissed charges"); United States v. Barron, 127 F.3d 
890,896-97 (9th Cir. 1997) (permitting government to reinstate dismissed charges). But see, e.g., United 
States v. Sandoval, 122 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding government cannot reinstate charges 
because defendant did not breach plea agreement by attacking conviction based on conduct no longer 
deemed criminal). See generally Ty Apler, The Danger of Winning: Contract Law Ramifications of 
SuccessfolBailey Challengesfor Plea-Convicted Defendants, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 841 (1997) (arguing that 
"a successful collateral attack is neither a breach of defendant's plea agreement with the government nor 
an act that requires recission of the agreement due to impracticability"); Henry O. Gabriel & Katherine A. 
Barski, Appellate Review of Sentences Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in the Fifth Circuit, 57 
LA. L. REv. 985 (1997) (examining appellate court application of Federal Sentencing Guidelines to 
Challenged Sentences); Recent Cases: Plea Agreements-Ninth Circuit Allows Post-Plea Agreement 
Collateral Attack Based on Charge in Underlying Law, United States v. Sandoval-Lopez, 122 F.3d 797 
(9th Cir. 1997), III HARV. L. REv. 603 (1997) (examining judiciary's reliance on contract law in 
analyzing plea agreements). 
151. 91 F.3d 699, 720 (5th Cir. Aug. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1467 (1997). 
152. See id. 
153. See id. 
154. See id. at 721. 
155. See id. (citing United States v. Munoz-Fabela, 896 F.2d 908, 911 (5th Cir. 1990); United States 
v. Ruiz, 986 F.2d 905, 911 (5th Cir. 1993». 
156. Jd. at 751 (Schwarzer, OJ., dissenting) (citing United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57,67-69 
(1984». 
157. See id. at 721 (arguing that participation in the gunfire was enough to sustain the charge of 
aiding and abetting); id. at 952-53 (Schwarzer, OJ., dissenting) (asserting that the factual findings of the 
court did not support a conspiracy charge); supra note 10 (discussing disagreement as to the correct 
standard to use and apply in determining whether the district court should have given a self-defense 
instruction). 
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an overt act to further the objectives of the conspiracy."us Since the predicate 
offense alleged was conspiracy to murder federal agents, the requisite intent 
which the government had to prove was malice aforethought. 159 However, in 
applying this standard to the evidence, the majority and dissent came to 
different conclusions. 16O The majority relied on the fact that Koresh held 
"Bible studies" during which he taught that the "enemy" was the A TF and the 
FBI, and must be kilIed. 161 However, the court pointed to evidence that only 
one of the five defendants convicted ever attended these classes. 162 The 
dissent criticized other evidence relied on by the court as merely showing that 
each defendant participated in the gun battle, but not that "any of them entered 
into an agreement to kill federal officers, much less that any did so with 
malice aforethought.,,163 As to the existence of an agreement, the majority 
appears to have answered the question correctly since this may be "inferred 
from the facts and circumstances" and does not require an express "meeting 
of the minds."I64 As to the mental state, again, given the rather broad reliance 
on inferences and circumstantial evidence, the evidence as to each defendant's 
involvement in the gun battle would seem to support such intent. 165 
IV. ApPLYING UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
The Fifth Circuit continues to grapple with issues raised after the 
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lopez, which found the Gun 
Free Zones Act of 1990 unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. l66 
During the survey period, all but one of the cases raising this issue challenged 
statutes prohibiting the possession of firearms.167 In the first of these cases, 
United States v. Knutson, the court found that 18 U .S.C. § 922(0) was not 
unconstitutional. 16s Although a panel had previously reached a similar 
conclusion in United States v. Kirk, it has no precedential value since the en 
banc affirmance was by an equally divided court. 169 The statute makes it 
158. Branch, 91 F.3d at 732 (citing United States v. Baker, 61 F.3d 317, 325 (5th Cir. 1995». 
159. See id. 
160. See id. at 732-35 (asserting that the "actions of each defendant ... signal[ed] membership in 
this conspiracy"); id. at 751-52 (Schwarzer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the district court's record does not 
support a finding that each defendant conspired to murder federal agents). 
161. See id. at 733. 
162. See id. 
163. [d. at 751-52 (Schwaner, OJ., dissenting). 
164. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAw § 6.4(d) (2nd ed. 1986) (citing 
Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975». 
165. See id. 
166. 514 U.S. 549, 549 (1995)(citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3); see 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1994); 
see also Bubany, supra note 3, at 461-66 (discussing post-Lopez cases during last year's survey period). 
167. See United States v. Knutson, 113 F.3d 27. 28 (5th Cir. May 1997) (concluding that § 922(0) 
is constitutional under the commerce clause). 
168. [d. 
169. 70 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 1995). vacated. 78 F.3d 160 (5th Cir. Mar. 1996), and affd en bane by 
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"unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machine gun.,,·70 In 
evaluating the statute, the court examined the three categories of activity 
which Congress may regulate according to Lopez: "( 1) the use of the channels 
of interstate commerce; (2) 'the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, even 
though the threat may come only from intrastate activities'; and (3) activities 
which have 'a substantial relation to interstate commerce ... i.e., those 
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.' ".7. The court found 
that section 922(0) fell within the second category and concluded that 
Congress could have rationally decided that "the availability of machine guns, 
violent crime, and narcotics trafficking" are part of a larger problem, and thus 
have seen that controlling or "freezing" the number of legally possessed 
machine guns was intertwined with interstate commerce.172 In addition, the 
court cited the fact that a majority of circuit courts considering the issue have 
upheld section 922(0).173 
The court also affirmed the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), which 
makes it unlawful for a convicted felon " 'to ship or transport in interstate or 
foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or 
ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped 
or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.' ".74 In United States v. 
Rawls, the court concluded that Lopez did not affect prior precedent upholding 
this statute. m The reason for this is that the statute contains a jurisdictional 
element, unlike section 922(q), the statute involved in Lopez.·76 Given the 
jurisdictional element set out in the statute, the court also held that "as applied 
an equally divided court, lOS F.3d 997 (5th Cir. Feb. 1997); see also Bubany, supra note 3, at 462-63 
(discussing the panel opinion in Kirk). 
170. 18 U.S.C. § 922(0)(1) (1994). The statute includes an exception for the lawful transfer or 
possession of a machine gun that was lawfully possessed before the effective date of the statute. See id. 
§ 922(0)(2)(8). 
171. Knutson, 113 F.3d at 29 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557-61 (1995». 
172. Id. at 31 (citing United States v. Beuckelaere, 91 F.3d 781, 785 (6th Cir. 1996». 
173. See id. at 28. See generally United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1267 (11th Cir. 1997) 
(determining that Congress has ample authority to prohibit the possession or transfer of machine guns 
under § 922(0»; United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 274-94 (3rd Cir. 1996) (concluding that the 
enactment of § 922(0) was a proper exercise of Congress's authority to regulate under the Commerce 
Clause); United States v. Beuckelaere, 91 F.3d 781, 782-88 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that § 922(0) was 
constitutional based on all three Lopez categories); United States v. Kenney, 91 F.3d 884, 885-91 (7th Cir. 
1996) (upholding § 922(0) as a regUlation of activities substantially affecting interstate commerce); United 
States v. Rambo, 74 F.3d 948, 951-55 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996) (determining that 
§ 922(0) is constitutionally proper under the Commerce Clause); United States v. Brown, 72 F.3d 96, 96-
97 (8th Cir. 1995) (rejecting appellant's Lopez challenge on the basis that § 924(c)(I) is a permissible 
exercise of the legislature's power under the Commerce Clause); United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518, 
1522 (lOth Cir. 1995) (finding that"§ 922(0) represents a permissible exercise of the authority granted to 
Congress under the Commerce Clause"). 
174. United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242 (5th Cir. June 1996) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) 
(1994». 
175. Id; see also United States v. Wallace, 889 F.2d 580, 583 (5th Cir. 1989) (creating Fifth Circuit 
precedent upholding the statute). 
176. See Raw/s, 85 F.3d at 242. 
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to Rawls," the statute was constitutional because the statute required only a 
showing that the firearm "had previously traveled in interstate commerce." 177 
The court relied on a pre-Lopez Supreme Court decision that held that section 
922(g) only required that a minimal nexus need be shown. 178 The government 
had presented expert evidence that the weapon had been manufactured in 
Massachusetts, indicating that the firearm's presence in Texas had resulted 
from interstate commerce. l79 Therefore, the court affirmed the conviction.180 
In United States v. Corona, the court engaged in a bit more thoughtful 
analysis as to the effect of Lopez on statutes that include a jurisdictional 
element. 181 Corona involved an as applied challenge to a federal statute 
prohibiting one from maliciously burning buildings used in, or affecting, 
interstate commerce. 182 In Corona, the defendants burned a building they had 
hoped to use as a bed and breakfast, and the fire spread to the United Cab 
warehouse. 18l The court stated that Lopez called into question cases that 
evaluated the effect on interstate commerce for a "minimal effect" such as 
when the defendant is prosecuted for burning a private home connected to 
natural gas lines. 184 This question arises due to the following language used 
in Lopez: ,,' [T]he proper test requires an analysis of whether the regulated 
activity 'substantially affects' interstate commerce.' ,,18S The court stated that 
if only the burning of the private house were involved, the government may 
not have presented enough evidence of a "substantial nexus" to interstate 
commerce. 186 However, since the fire spread to the Union Cab warehouse, 
even the stronger showing which Lopez arguably requires, would be satisfied 
since the burning of a cab company building "can have a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce."187 Thus, while other circuits have continued to apply 
pre-Lopez authority to statutes containing a jurisdictional element, the Fifth 
Circuit in Corona has indicated that this application might not be 
177. Jd. (quoting United States v. Fitzhugh, 984 F.2d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 1993». 
178. See id. at 243 (citing Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 575 (1977». 
179. See id. 
180. See id. The court also relied on this decision in other challenges to § 922(g) during the survey 
period. See United States v. Dickey, 102 F.3d 157, 163 (5th Cir. Dec. 1996); United States v. Harkrider, 
88 F.3d 1408, 1409 (5th Cir. July 1996), cer/. denied, 117 S. Ct. 446 (1996); see also United States v. 
Wells, 98 F.3d 808, 811 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 389 (11th Cir. 1996), 
cer/. denied, 117 S. Ct. 262 (1996); United States v. Bennett, 75 F.3d 40, 49 (1st Cir. 1996), cer/. denied, 
117 S. Ct. 130 (1996). 
181. 108 F.3d 565, 569-70 (5th Cir. Mar. 1997), reh 'g denied, motion /0 modify granted, 1997 U.S. 
App. Lexis 6633 (5th Cir. Apr. 7, 1997). 
182. See id. (explaining 18 U.S.C. § 844(i)(I994) and its relation to the defendant's actions). 
183. See id. at 567-68. 
184. See id. (citing United States v. Hicks, 106 F.3d 187, 188 (7th Cir. 1997), cer/. denied, 117 S. 
Ct. 2425 (1997». 
185. Jd. at 569 (quoting United State v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-60 (1995». 
186. See id. at 570. 
187. Jd. at 571. 
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appropriate. 188 However, in subsequent opinions the court has retreated from 
such musings. 189 
V. CONCLUSION 
There is no single theme emerging from the variety of cases decided by 
the Fifth Circuit during this survey period. Nonetheless, the interpretational 
issues following both the Bailey and Lopez Supreme Court cases illustrate the 
extent to which some confusion still remains. In addition, it will be 
interesting to observe whether the inconsistencies in the Branch opinion, 
discussed in Part I of this article, impact future cases involving more than one 
defendant. 
188. See id. at 570-71. 
189. See United States v. Miles, 122 F.3d 235,240-41 (5th Cir. Sept. 1997) (holding that a de 
minimis nexis was sufficient as long as a substantial effect resulted from repetition); United States v. 
Robinson, 119 F.3d 1205, 1211-12 (5th Cir. Aug. 1997) (holding that the particular conduct at issue need 
not have a substantial effect upon interstate commerce and cumulative effects must be considered). 
